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STOPPING HYPERINFLATIONS PAST ANDPRESENT.
Rudiger Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer.1
From Diocietian to Alfonsin, history is replete with attempts, some
successful, to reduce the inflation rate and stabilize the currency. Each
episode has been written about at length, the experiences of groups of
countries at particular times——such as Europe after World War I, and Latin
America between the World Wars—-have been compared, but the general lessons
have rarely been analyzed.2 Our intention is to begin a systematic study
with this prologue that sets out some lessons from well—known episodes, and
that also examines the two major inflation stabilization programs of 1985.
those of Argentina and Israel.
We start with a simple theoretical apparatus that develops
the interactions of inflation, the budget and money growth, and the role of
expectations. We then examine four historical inflation stabilizations, as
well as the Current Argentinian and Israeli attempts.
1Depart.ent of Economics. MIT, and Research Associates, NBER. This
paper was started during our visit to the Kiel Institut fur
Weltwirtschaft, August 1985. Access to the outstanding collection of
the library was invaluable; we would particularly like to thank Frau
Gillani for her extraordinary helpfulness. Financial support from the
National Science Foundation and a Guggenheim Fellowship to Fischer are
ratefully acknoiwedged.
The League of Nations (1946) survey of post—World War I European
experiences and eager et al (1981) do draw implications from their
studies.2
The 1923 stabilization of the Ger.an mark is surely the •ost famous
of all stabilizations, and is certainly the economists prototype. We start
the descriptive section of the paper with an outline of the German
stabilization, noting both the policy measures that were taken and the
economic consequences of the stabilization. We then survey the Austrian and
Polish stabilizations of the 1920's, and the Italian stabilization of 1947,
before examining the ongoing modern attempts.
The type of issue with which we are concerned is whether success
requires most or all of the following measures: an immediate reduction in
the growth rate of money, fixing the exchange rate, fiscal reform, the
prohibition of indexation. foreign loans, foreign supervision, a capital
levy, the imposition or abandonment of price controls. We examine also
whether currency reforms and stabilizations have typically been preceded by
unsuccessful attempts, and followed by high real interest rates, real
exchange appreciation, and recession.
Before proceeding to the review of individual experiences of
inflation and stabilization it is worth spelling out some of the basic
issues as they have been developed in the literature since at least the
1920s.
1.INFLATION, REAL BALANCES ANDSEIGNORAGE
Cagan(1956)inhis classical analysis of hyperinflations focussed
on the interaction of money creation and expectations. In the Cagan model
the demand for real balances depends on the expected rate of inflation, ii.
Using the Cagan demand function for money3
(M/P) • e*,a >o
where ii' is the expected rate of Inflation and a the semi—elasticity of
money demand with respect to expected inflation, equilibrium In the money
market over tine requires that the growth In the supply of real balances
equal the rate of growth in demand:
(1) e —ii—a(dt/dt).
Here e and it are nominal money growth and the actual inflation rate
respectively. The model Is completed by adaptive expectations
(2) (tht*/dt) 8(Tt—TV)
Combining(1) and (2) yields an equation for the change in the
expected rate of inflation:
(3) (drr/dt) (e_Tr*)/(l_a8)
As is well—known, the stability of the inflationary process, given
money growth, then depends on whether the coefficient (l—aB) is positive or
negative. It will be positive and the inflationary process stable when
aB <1,that is when money demand responds little to expected inflation and
ihen expectations adjust sluggishly.
Black (1974) and Sargent and Wallace (1973) approached the money and
inflation question from the point of view of rational expectations: when4
expectations are rational and there is no uncertainty in the model, iTT!.
Therefore there should not be an independent expectations formation
mechanism, inflation dynamics would simply be given by (1) inverted to
solve for inflation as a function of the money supply and Its expected path.
(la) ITh(M/P)
Given a money supply process, for instance constant growth of money, there
is typically an infinity of solutions for the price path, with only one of
them not implying unstable price behavior.
Sargent and Wallace applied this model to the question of
inflationary finance posed by Cagan. Equation (Ia) is then supplemented by
a model of the deficit. Let the real deficit be d.3 The real revenue from
money creation, (dM/dt)/P must equal the deficit, or the growth rate of




where mfl/P is the level of real balances.
in the Sargent—Wallace model nominal money growth is endogeneous
since it is governed by the need to finance a given real deficit at whatever
is the current level of prices. The model is completed by an equation
specifying the evolution of real balances as the difference between nominal
money growth and the rate of inflation
3Both the demand for real balances and the deficit are expressed as a
ratio to GNP.5
(5) u/n =e — 1•td/n —h(a)=f(m,d)
Bruno and Fischer (1985) have shown that there is typically a
possibility of multiple equlibria because of the Laffer curve effect.
Specifically, with the Cagan demand function they show the existence of two
equilibria, the high inflation one being a stable solution under rational
expectations.Figure 1 shows this result, using a slightly different
graphical apparatus than theirs.The downward sloping LL schedule is the
demand for real balances. The (ni=O) schedule is a rectangular hyperbola
along which It(s) =d.There are two equilibria.
The stability of the two equilibria depends entirely on the nature
of expectations formation, as Bruno—Fischer show. If expectations are
rational, the high inflation equilibrium is stable, and the low inflation
equilibrium unstable. flexpectationsare slowly adapting, the low
inflation equilibrium is stable.
A further important implication of the model is immediately obvious
from Figure 1.If the deficit is too large there will not be any steady
state equilibrium. The (iii=0) locus moves to the right as the deficit
increases, and eventually nay not intersect the money demand equation at
all. Hyperinflation would be a strong possibility.
We proceed from here with an extension to recognize some endogeneous
in the budget. Two points in particular matter institutionally. The
Tirst is that there is typically a given nominal debt that was issued as
long—term debt at fixed nominal interest. The process of inflation will
erode the debt and thereby erode the real value of debt service.4 Inflation
4This was certainly the situation in the 1920's hyperinflations, and
in the 1982 Argentinian debt wipe—out. It is more difficult when the






thus presents itself as a stabilizing force. On the other side inflation
affects the real value of tax collection via collection lags. If there are
fixed lags between aôcrual and payment of taxes, without indexation or
interest payments, then a higher rate of inflation automatically means a
reduction in the real value of tax collection. We formalize these two points
by making the real budget deficit, d, a function of the real value of the
debt, b=B/P, and of inflation:
(6) d d(b,ii)
Under the assumption that the government Is not borrowing, the
dynamics of the real stock of debt are given by Inflationary erosion of real
debt:
(7) b/b =—fl—h(m)
Figure 2 is the phase diagram for this model, highlighting the
interaction of inflationary money creation, debt erosion and the
erosion of fiscal revenues. To the right of the (b=O) schedule there is
inflation and hence a growing real debt, while to the left the debt is being
eroded. The (m=O) schedule once again reflects the possibility of multiple
equilibria. We assume here only two equilibria although now in terms of
Figure 1 the budget constraint becomes more complicated since the real
deficit that is to be financed by money creation depends both on the
inflation rate and on the real value of debt. The tax erosion effect would
reshape the budget deficit hyperbola in Figure 1 to a schedule lying further
to the right of the hyperbola the higher the inflation rate. This creates
the possibility that the high inflation equilibrium is removed. The
existence of the debt shifts the budget deficit schedule, one schedule
corresponding to each level of the real debt.7
Figure 2 shows the case of two steady state equilibria each of which
could be attained under rational expectations. One has a high rate of
inflation and no debt, at A, the other has some residual debt outstanding
and zero inflation.5 Which equilibrium will be reached depends on the
initial ratio of debt to Money, b/rn, and on the initial price level which
can be thought of as a point on a ray through the origin. Of course, it is
also possible that in the region to the left of JA an excessively high
initial price level induces an ever-accelerating inflation.
The multiplicity of equilibria and paths In Figure 2 immedIately
poses the important theoretical issue of how hyperinflations originate. One
view is that they simply represent transitory periods of debt liquidation
and eventually self—correcting deficit finance. Another is that by some
accident (or policy) the economy picks an unstable path. A particularly
interesting possibility in this context comes from exchange rates which are
not part of the model. Much of the literature, in particular the balance of
payments theory of inflation, assigns a primary role to exchange rate
collapse in bringing about hyperinf'lation. Whether or not the exchange rate
is primary, there is no doubt that the dynamics of exchange rates affects
price level dynamics. In terms of Figure 2, straining the model a bit, an
exchange rate collapse could certainly throw the economy from a path heading
toward B to another one leading to A or even to accelerating hyperinflation
below iA
A final point concerns deficits that are financed not only by money
but also, in part, by debt. This introduces the distinction between fixed






interestdebt, Issued (predominantly during wartime) before the inflationary
episode got under way, and new debt that is Issued at floating rates or in
indexed form. With debt financing part of the deficit, the questions of
debt dynamics arise, specifically whether the after tax real rate of
interest exceeds the growth rate of real tax revenue.
2. THE GERMAN HYPERINFLATION OF 1923.
The German stabilization of November 15th 1923 Is certainly the best
known of them all. It brings up all the problems that could possibly arise
In the stabilization context: budget balance and constraints on central bank
monetization of deficits, the role of the exchange rate, external
stabilization loans, interest rate policy. "The' lessons to be learnt from
history are the lessons drawnfromthe German experience: that
hyperinflation results from a collapse of the exchange rate for some; for
others that deficit finance is the source of the trouble.The policy
lessons follow: for some that exchange rate pegging is the key to
stabilization; for others that it is budget balancing, brought about by
legal restrictions on the stock of money, or the appointment of a strong
central banker.
The German stabilization involved monetary and exchange rate policy
decisions as well as balancing the budget, strongly suggesting that budget
balancing is not the only consideration. It is true that all the successful
Inflation stabilizations involved budget correction.But so did sore
unsuccessful stabilizations where, even with budget movement in the right
direction, early attempts at stabilization failed and only on the second or
third try was there success.9
The background for the German hyperinflation is, of course, World
War I. During the War the level of prices had increased significantly for
all .ajor countries. The price increase was greater in Germany, by a factor
of four, compared with 2.5 in the United States and the United Kingdom or
-3.4in France. More significantly, the budget deteriorated sharply, for
four reasons:
• reduced tax base and increased extraordinary expenses
increased debt service
• reparation payments
• inflationary erosion of tax revenues
The combined impact of these factors was to create a budget deficit
which by 1920/21 was already 65% of total spending, not counting
reparations. During 1922/23 the budget deteriorated further for two
reasons. The French occupation of the Ruhr cut tax revenues and created
large outlays associated with 'passive resistance". At the same time
accelerating exchange depreciation fed inflation and hence tax erosion.
Taxes as a fraction of total expenditures fell to only 1.3 percent at the
peak of the hyperinflation in November 1923.
Table 1. THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET, GERMANY.
(Million Gold Marks, fiscal year April—March)
1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925
April—Oct. Total
Revenue 327529751508 588 2619 77577334
Outlays 9329 6651 3951 5278 9158 72207444
Deflcit/ 64.955.361.8 88.9 71.4 —0.7 1.5
Outlays (%)
Source: Baumgartner, Graham, Wirtschaft und Statistik10
The German hyperinflation shows the clear pattern of mas8iVe
deficits continuing for several years, leading to increasing inflation,
increasing velocity and falling real tax revenue until some event leads to
exchange rate collapse and hence a completely uncontrolled inflation. In
Germany the critical event was the January 1923 French occupation of the
Ruhr and the resulting charges on the budget.
Two stabilizations were attempted.The first took place in
February—April 1923. The government simply fixed the exchange rate and used
reserves, which were still significant, to sustain the rate. The policy was
dramatically successful in the sense that exchange rate stability brought
with it price stability. As is to be expected from the models of
speculative attack the central bank in fact accumulated re8erves as
speculative inflows for a while sustained the exchange support.6 But because
the budget drain via the Ruhr expenses continued unabated, indeed increased,
the exchange rate was ultimately unsustainable. The reserve drain became too
large and the Reichsbank decided to save the remaining reserves. Prom May
through November there ensued an ever—increasing inflation and depreciation.
The •onthly rates of exchange depreciation show this pattern:
Table 2: EXCHANGE DEPRECIATION, GERMANY1923(Percent per month)
May JuneJulyAugustSeptember October
95% 131%221% 1307% 2035% 25957%
Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik
The legal basis for the successful stabilization was an authority
6See Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) for models of
speculative attack on a fixed exchange rate regime.11
for emergency legislation. Under the authority the government created a new
currency—-the Rentenmark——and provided for restrictions on the monetization
of deficits, increases in tax collection and cuts in outlays. The
legislation for the Rentenmark waspassedon October 15, 1923 and the new
currency came into existence on November 15th 1923. From November 20th the
exchange rate was fixed.
The details of the reform were:
The Rentenbank was set up as a new bank of issue. Its total issue was
to be limited, and covered by claims on Industry and agriculture. Only part
of' the issue was to accrue to the government as a once and for all
allocation. In part earmarked to retire the floating debt and thus to
improve the budget directly. Note here an important feature of
stabilizations, the potential use of a once and for all issue of the new
money to retire public debt and to cover the governments deficit until
fiscal reform takes hold.
The Reichsbank had until November discounted government debt and thus
financed the deficit. It had also discounted private debt at well below
market rates, thus avoiding crowding out and aggravating the external
deficit. The new legislation provided that the Relchsbank could no longer
discount government paper and that note issue had to be backed by a 30 gold
cover.
After currency issue had ceased, the currency, subject to exchange
contro1, was depreciated from 1.26 billion marks/S on November 14 to 4.2
billion marks/S on November 20, thereby reducing the real money supply
massively and raising the gold cover of the remaining stock of •oney toward
100%.12
• Issue of Notgeld (scrip) was restricted and the existing stocks were
to be phased out over time.
/
•Taxes were anticipated (to be paid in advance) and valorized (fixed
in real terms) and regulations were passed to achieve econo.ies in
government enterprises. Payments for relief of the unemployed in the Ruhr
were reduced.
The reform took hold immediately. Prices stopped rising virtually at
once.
Table 3: PRICES AFTER THE STABILIZATION, GERMANY.
1923 1924
Nov. Dec. Jan Feb March April MayJune
WPI 10089 8584 87 90 89 84
Mark/$*270 140 137 142 141 141 136 132
*November 15th, 1923 100.
The halt to the increase in prices •eant increasing real tax
revenues. The anticipation of taxes, economies in government and the
payments of taxes arranged in August and September all combined to turn
around the budget virtually immediately. (See Table 1 above).
The monetary reform shows up in the changed picture of the money
supply. Whereas in the pre-reform phase paper money was predominant,
significantly more of the means of payment in the post/November period were
of the constant purchasing power variety13
Table 4: COMPOSITION OF THE MONEY SUPPLY. GERMANY1923/1924
(Millions of goidmarks)
1923 1924
10 11 12 6 12
Paper 176518608 1097
Wertbest. 124 1066 1666 1837
Total 300 1585 2274 3129 4274
Index 191310O 5.0 26.1 37.5 51.5 70.3
Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik See also p.67. 1925 for annual coiparisofl
1913 to 1924 on total money stock. "Wertbest(aendlg)' indicates indexed
.oney. .ainly to gold.
The exchange rate was effectively sustained by extre.iely high
interest rates. in the •onth of Dece,ber, in the face of price stability
interest rates reached 10 to 20 per day. Even by the end of December the
interest rate was still aore than one half percent per day. The average
annual rate for January 1925 was still as high as 88 percent.
An interesting episode occurred in April 1924. The Central Bank had
allowed its discount of private bills to expand significantly. As a result
the exchange rate came under pressure in foreign .arkets and the discount
started to reduce confidence in the stabilization. The Reichsbank responded
with a dra.atic rise in interest rates and curtni1ent of credit. The
exchange rate was sustained at the cost of a rise in unemployment.
The interest rate pattern in 1923, using the monthly rate. confirms
the role of tight money in coping with the confidence crisis. The rates
shownaremonthly, the rate being indexed (wertbestaendig)
1923,1 1923,11 1923,111 1923,IV
26.9 40.5 19.5 11.514
How was the stabilization achieved? Clearly the budget was turned
around, but that means a shift in the form of taxation from seignorage to
outright taxation.It is not even clear, distribution effects aside,
ihether the increased open taxation would have any adverse effects on
aggregate demand. High real interest rates clearly helped both in
suppressing demand, and sustaining the exchange rate. So without any
question did the political stabilization which •eant less conflict inthe
Ruhr and, later in the year, access to foreign loans.
The unemployment effects associated with the stabilization can be
seen in Table 5. The data refer to the fraction of union members
unemployed.
Table 5: UNEMPLOYMENT IN GERMANY, 1923-1924.
Sept.1923 Nov.1923 Jan.1924April 1924 Oct. 1924
9.9% 23.4% 26.5% 10.4% 8.4%
The other interesting feature is the behavior of real wages. It is
definitely not the case that the stabilization was achieved by a cut in the
real wage. While real wages in 1923—24 were significantly below their pre-
War levels they did rise after the stabilization as the accompanying data
show.
Table 6: GERMAN REAL WAGES
1913Aug.1922Oct.1923Dec.1923June 1924
Skilled 35.0 25.2 18.2 24.5 31.3
Unskilled 24.3 22.7 15.7 20.7 23.9
Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik15
The recovery of real wages in the period after the stabilization of
course reflects a real appreciation. A significant fact in the German
stabilization is the real appreciation of the exchange rate that resulted
once the lag of wages and prices behind the exchange depreciation stopped.
That process got under way in November 1923 and lasted well into 1924.
Of the puzzling questions about the German experience the most
interesting surely is how the economy could withstand such extremely high
real interest rates in the post—stabilization phase without a much larger
collapse of economic activity. That point is reinforced when we recognize
the effect of reduced inflation on corporate finance. Firms that were
collecting taxes and benefitting from the delay in making payments were in
fact receiving subsidized loans from the Treasury. This would apply, for
example, to withholding taxes. With the end of inflation this subsidized
form of credit vanished, thus raising the average cost of capital. The
failure of the extremely high real rates to cause a depression may be due to
the virtual vanishing of external financing in the hyperinflation. This
mustbethe case for bank credit since banks (along with money) had shrunk
dramatically.
The other question is how to think of the high interest rates. One
view is to link them via international capital mobility to rates abroad. In
that approach the high rate denotes expected collapse of the reform. The
alternative deemphasizes international capital flows and sees the high rate
as a reflection of the disappearance of real balances. The high exchange
rate, relative to the stock of money would keep real balances low and hence16
interest rates high. The two mechanis.s might also be linked. The issue is
of interest because it comes up in the same way in •any countries, including
at the present time Argentina and Israel.
2. THE AUSTRIAN STABILIZATION, 1922.
The Austro—Hungarlan empire was broken up In the aftermath of World
War I and Austria emerged with much of the public debt and few of the
productive assets.7 Among the unproductive assets was most of the
bureaucracy that had run the Austro—Hungarian empire, and that was still on
the public payroll. With food production in the former empire down, each
successor state sought to prevent the export of food, and even within
Austria the provinces tried to prevent the shipment of food to Vienna.
Hunger and economic disruption during and after the War led to governmental
instability, with the example of soviet republics in Budapest and Munich
making budget balance a low priority.8
The budget deficit, shown in Table 7, was increasingly financed by
credit creation and thus brought about inflation and currency depreciation.
7See "Die Sanierung Oestereichs" In Wirtschaft und Statlstik,1923,
gP.lSS—l59.
Van Waire de Bordes (1924), Chapter 1, describes the political and
economic background of the hyperinflation. See also Yeager (1981)
pp.45—52.17
Table 7: THE AUSTRIAN BUDGET, 1919-1923.
(Millions of Gold Crowns)
1919 1920 1921 1922 1923*
3 Qtrs Year
DeficIt: 676.4 922.7 462.9 616.8 111.4
-TaxReceipts 632.3 166.0 197.0 116.0 255.1 401.9
Expenditure 1308.91088.7 659.9 732.8 366.5
F i nanc I ng
External 118.1 454.6 63.4 331.8 111.4
Domestic 558.4 468.1 399.5 285.0 -
Source:Wlrtschaft und Stetistik
Note: Calculated via the dollar exchange rate, 14.4 Paper Crowns=lGold
Crown. *3 Qtrs are first 9 months.
The stages of the inflation and stabilization can be seen in Table 8
and Figures 3 and 4. With tax receipts financing less than 20% of spending
In 1920, money growth and inflation in that year were rapid. The price
level Increased by 80%, the stock of bank notes increased three fold,and
the exchange rate depreciated to a similar extent despite a periodof
appreciation in the middle of the year. But it was in 1921 thatthe
inflation began to reach hyperinflationary levels, with prices rising
sixfold in the second half of the year, and the exchange rate by a factorof
5 over the same period. Inflation increased in 1921 even though the budget
deficit was reduced by cutting expenditure. The increase in inflation
eroded tax collection and led to rapid rates of increase of the stockof
notes.Figure 3















Table 8: THE AUSTRIAN INFLATION ANDSTABILIZATION.
(Percentage change over previous 3 month at .onthly rates)
Depreciation Inflation Money Growth
Notes Deposits
1921
June 9.1 7.1 6.6
September 26.0 12.8 12.2
December 35.7 63.6 35.4
1922
March 38.7 15.6 20.4
June 30.8 31.9 21.8 9.4
September 68.5 81.8 60.6 21.3
December 0 —4.7 21.4 51.6
1923
March 0 1.5 3.0 26.9
June 0 4.0 6.8 14.6
September 0 0.8 4.6 11.1
December 0 1.4 4.6 10.4
Source: Young( 1925)
Note: Deposits at the end of 1923 were equal to one tenth of note
circulation.
Inflation fell to 15 per month in the first quarter of 1922 but
then accelerated until in the third quarter it was at an annual rate of
13O,O00. The exchange rate likewise depreciated rapidly in the third
quarter of 1922. A key point in the inflationary acceleration was the June
1922 decision to accord monthly wage indexatlon on the basis of the previous
months inflation.
Contemporary accounts emphasized the role of the exchange rate in
the Inflation process.
-"The foreign exchange rates were a guide to the probable movement of prices.
The first question which the Austrian population asked every afternoon was
'How are the foreign exchanges moving? or more exactly 'What does Zurich
say about the crown?' ('Wie komat die Krone aus Zurich?')"9
9Van Walre de Bordes (1924), p. 197.19
The argu.ent was that the exchange depreciation drove domestic prices, which
in turn drove the •oney supply. Whether this was the case or whether
instead or in addition future price develop.ents first moved the exchange
rate we cannot say at this stage, but the question re.ains an important one
for future research.
Stabilization came suddenly and decisively in August 1922. A new
government under Seipel had taken office in May 1922. Monsignor Selpel, an
accomplished politician, soon began negotiations for a foreign loan. The
stabilization occurred when the success of the negotiations became expected,
and before an agreement on the loan——to be guaranteed by Britain, France.
Czechoslovakia, and Italy——was complete. It was known though that there
would be foreign supervision of the terms of any agreements.
Key steps toward stabilization occurred before late 1922. The most
important was the elimination in late 1921 of food subsidies, which had been
a major drain on the budget. In 1920, the Austrian Section of the
Reparation Comnisslon produced the "Goode Scheme", proposing that Austria
receive a loan as it reformed its public finances, but the Allied
governments refused. In June 1921 the League of Nations Financial Committee
had recommended a stabilization loan for Austria. But complications,
including United States Congressional delay in dealing with the issue and
Austrian unwillingness to accept foreign supervision, made the negotiations
collapse. In March 1922 the exchange rate was stabilized for a month with
the help of a British loan, but this was not enough to stabilize prices and
the inflation and exchange depreciation went into their final spiral.20
At this stage the Austrian government threatened to give up. In
August 1922 in appealing to the Supreme Council of the Allied Powersfor aid
the Austrian Minister in London wrote
If against all expectations this last hope were also to prove
-ohi.ericalthe Austrian Govern.ent .. wouldhave to call together specially
the Austrian Parliament and to declare ..thatneither the present nor any
other G8vernment is in a position to continue the administration of the
State
After an initial rejection of the appeal, negotiations for a loan
began in August and were completed in October. A loan of 650 millIonGold
Crown became available, first as collateral, and in 1923 In fact. The
conditionality that went with the loan was tight indeed: the government was
to be given emeregency powers to i.plement budget reform and was to set up a
new and independent central bank. A League of Nations commissioner was
appointed to monitor the implementation of the reform.
The statutes of the new central bank excluded financing of the
government except against deposit of an equal amount In gold. Noteissue
was to be covered by a 20 percent reserve ratio for the first five years,
rising later to one—third.
Just the prospect of the loan was sufficient to stabilize the
exchange rate on August 25; prices reached their highest level on September
15. StabilIzation was complete, to the extent that the crown appreciated
more than 16% by the end of 1922.
The Austrian stabilization is interesting because it took place
without the budget coming into immediate balance (see Table 10). On the
10
Van Waire de hordes, p.27.21
strength of the forthcoming League of Nations loans and after legislation to
implement the ter.s of the loans, the government raised a domestic gold
crown denominated loan. Since the external resources were eXpre8Sly
designed to bridge the budget gap in the first two years it is not
surprising that the government was able to continue running a deficit,
albeit a sharply reduced one.The central bank issued •oney backed until
November by government paper, later by monetisation of government gold
(Table 9), received from the liquidation of the Austro—Hungarian Bank and
foreign exchange inflows.11
Table 9 THE CEJTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET, AUSTRIA.
(Millions of Gold Crowns,end of' month)
NotesGovt Paper Private Credit Gold
1922
September 150.6 65.9 51.8 50.5
October 199.8 93.1 58.9 30.6
November 231.9 173.7 48.9 32.1
December 285.3 178.9 54.7 25.0
1923
March 309.7 177.0 57.4 110.8
June 383.4 177.0 51.0 203.0
September 435.5 177.0 60.3 249.3
December 498.3 177.0 92.5 305.1
Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik and Young(1925)
Even though the government deficit was not corrected immediately the
budget correction proceeded rapidly and indeed ahead of schedule. For the
111t is obvious ex post that the stabilization was a success. It was
not obvious at the time: van Waire de Bordes writing in 1924
describes episodes of loss of confidence in October 1922 and early
1923. Confidence was secured whenthe gold reserves of the Central
Bank began to increase from the beginning of March 1923.22
first 9 months of 1923 tax receipts ran 24 percent above the targets agreed
with the League and expenditures remained 2 percent below the agreed
ceiling. As a result the deficit reached only 61 percent of the level that
had been anticipated.12 A major reason for the extremely good performance
was the rapid increase in real tax collection resulting from price
stability.
Strong private speculative support developed for the program once
the fiscal correction was under way and especially when the external loans
were received. As a result the Central Bank was soon supporting the
exchange rate against appreciation. The strong private support was, no
doubt, in part due to the fact that other countries were undergoing
increasing instability. Certainly Germany and Poland were well into their
hyperinflations at the timeAustriahad established stability.
As in other countries, the stabilization was followed by a rapid
rate of increase of the money stock. The supply of banknotes increased by
287% over the year starting September 7 1922, and by 75% during 1923. The
1923 increase was based almost entirely on an increase in the Central Bank's
gold holdings.
Unemployment rose sharply from September 1922 to March 1923. and
thereafter fell steadily.13 The stock market boomed from early 1923 as both
repatriated and foreign capital cane into the economy.
See Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1923 p.156
Van Waire de Bordes (p.218) shows unemployment rising from 31,000
-in August 1922 to 167,000 in March 1923. The coverage of these data
is not indicated; the population of Austria was 6 mIllion, indicating
a labor force in the vicinity of 2 million. The unemployment data
are presumably only partial, perhaps in Vienna.23
4. THE POLISH STABILIZATIONS, 1924—1927.
Poland was set up in the aftermath of World War I in the
intersection of four monetary areas. The occupying Germans had instituted a
Polish mark; in western Poland the German •ark circulated, in Galicia the
Austrian crown, and in eastern Poland the Russian ruble. Each of these four
currencies was about to suffer a hyperinflatlon.
The new government succeeded by 1920 in replacing the foreign
currencies and instituting the Polish mark as the medium of exchange and
sole legal tender. The Polish mark was issued by the Polish State Loan
Bank, which operated under the authority of the Finance Minister. Poland
was at war with Soviet Russia until 1920. Tax collection was small, and the
printing of marks the main method of financing.
Table 10 shows monthly rates of increase of the wholesale price
index, the exchange rate and the currency stock over three—month periods
from 1921 to 1924.14 A hyperinflation was already under way by the
beginning of 1920: the mark had depreciated against the dollar by a factor
of 30 from the middle of 1919 to the end of 1920, while the currency stock
had risen over the same period by a factor of 40.15
14The use of monthly rates conceals the extremes to which annual
rates had risen. A monthly rate of increase of 40% compounds to
5570% per annum; the 169% per month Inflation of the last quarter of
23 is above 14 million % per annum.
The data in Table 10 do not imply a decline In real balances over
the period 1921 to early 1924.With real note holdings equal to 100
in January 1921, they were 40 in December 1923, but 112 in April
1924, where the calculation is based on data reported in Sargent
(1982), pp 67—70.24
The First Attempt: Despite rapid depreciation of the mark, the inflation
rate was lower in 1921 than in 1920.In Septe.ber the Finance Minister was
given extraordinary powers to deal with the economy. His plan was to work
on both the supply and the demand sides, providing assistance to industry on
the supply side, reducing government spending and imposing a capital levy on
the demand side. The ensuing budget surplus would be used to withdraw half
the currency in circulation.
The stabilization attempt reduced the price level, and produced a
20 real appreciation of the Polish mark16 in the last quarter of 1921. The
stabilization attempt was followed by unemployment17 and by strikes as
employers tried to cut wages. The real wage in industry increased in the
last quarter of 1921, never again to fall to the low levels it had reached
in the third quarter of 1921.
The government maintained a small budget deficit through the first
quarter of 1922, but then did not carry through on its budget plans, and as
Figure 5 shows the deficit increased from the second quarter of 1922.
Currency growth stayed remarkably low relative to earlier levels, and up to
the middle of the year was entirely consistent with the increase in the
demand for money that would have occurred had stabilization been achieved.
16Yeager et al (1981) p.68 imply that the mark continued appreciating
through June 1922. The underlying data show a sharp appreciation at
the end of 1921 followed by (mostly) depreciation. The monthly data
in Young (1925) p.351 for the dollar exchange rate in New York and
international Abstract p.170 for the rate in Warsaw show
eubstantially different patterns. In both though, the May 1922
-change rate is higher (more appreciated) than its fall 1921 peak.
Unemployment data from the Statistiches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche
Reich reported in Sargent (1982) p.72 indicate a tripling of
unemployment from September 1921 to February 1922, but the total
numbers unemployed are so small that the data must refer to only part





























































































































































































































But from the middle of 1922 the deficit increased sharply, and the rates of
inflation, currency growth and depreciation returned to the 20 per month
range.
For the remainder of the hyperinflationary period, the exchange
rate and the price level moved very closely together. There is a broad,
though not precise, correspondence between the rate ofcurrencygrowth and
inflation or depreciation over the period.




June 1921 11.5 2.5 40.0
Sep. 1921 14.2 19.4 44.8
Dec. 1921 14.5 —1.8 —22.3
Mar. 1922 3.0 8.8 10.6
June 1922 6.2 6.1 4.4
Sep. 1922 15.6 20.2 23.8
Dec. 1922 19.6 31.5 27.4
Mar. 1923 32.4 41.8 33.3
June 1923 24.7 23.9 33.9
Sept 1923 46.4 33.5 46.4
Dec. 1923 123.7 169.1 170.6
Mar. 1924 68.2 19.9 13.9
Sources and Notes: 1. Data are monthly rates of change over the three months
preceding month shown. 2. WPI is from Young (1925); other columns are from
international Abstract of Economic Statistics 1919—1930, International
Conference of Economic Services, London, 1934 (henceforth International
Abstract.) 3. Currency column Is based on data described as 'Money in
circulation" in International Abstract, and as "Note circulation" by Sargent
(1982).
Expansion in the note issue in the period to early 1924 wascaused
by the budget deficit.18The large increase in the deficit in 1923, seen
18Young (1925), Vol. II, p165 shows advances to thegovernment and
notes in circulation increasing essentially in lockstep from mid-1919
to early in 1924.26
in Figure 5, led to the rapid money growth that triggered the final
hyperinflationary outburst19, further labor trouble, and the reform program.
The Second Attempt: The Grabski government of experts took office in
December 1923, wIth Grabskl also holding the Finance I4inister post.
Parliament again ceded power to deal with the economic situation to the
government. Grab8ki first restored order to the tax system by raising and
"valorizing" taxes, that is indexing them to the price of gold.2° There was
to be an extraordinary property tax (a capital levy) for the years ]924—
1926. The effect on the budget deficit was Immediate, to the extent of
creating a small surplus in April 1924. The improvement came from increased
taxes rather than reduced spending.
The mark exchange rate was stabilized from January 1924, even though
rapid money supply growth continued. The stabilization was achieved by
devaluing drastically, and by intervention in the foreign exchange market.
With the budget deficit under control, the government was able to announce
in February that it would not issue bank notes to cover its spending. The
notes that were issued were used to acquire foreign exchange and to make
loans to Industry.The government early in 1924 floated a small domestic
loan, and borrowed in Italy2l, success in the latter effort being regarded
as a signofforeign confidence.
19We do not have a GNP estimate for this period; the 1923 deficitwas
996 million zlotys (the zloty will be introduced below) which crude
lculatIons suggest was above 20% of GNP.
21Thjs account draws on Yeager et al.
TheItalianloan was for 400 million lire, less than $20 million,
and less than the value of one month's exports.27
A new currency, the zloty, had been announced at the end of January,
with a gold value equal to that of a gold franc, equivalent to anexchange
rate of 5.18 to the dollar. The zloty would be issued by a new central
bank, the Bank of Poland, the 100 million zloty capital of which was raised
by public subscription paid in early 1924 In gold or stable foreign
currencies. It was to hold gold and stable foreign exchange reserves to the
value of at least 30 of Its note issue. The government was allowed to
borrow interest free up to 50 •lllion zlotys.22
The Bank of Poland began issuing zloty notes in May 1924.E. Hilton
Young, English adviser to the government, questioned the advisability of
currency reform before budget balance had been definitely established.23
Figures 5 and 6 show that the criticism was prescient. The budget deficit
increased to its 1922 levels by the riddle of 1924. Exports fell, as a
result both of a poor harvest and in 1925 a dispute with Ger.any on coal
exports.
Domestic inflation resumed in the third quarter of 1924, but the
exchange rate was held fixed despite the worsening trade balance and the
onset of domestic inflation. Foreign exchange reserves fell from 270
million zlotys In January 1925 to 120 million in June, despite the raising
of American loans worth 120 millIon zlotys at the then exchange rate.
Wholesale prices rose 28 In the first quarter of 1925. Data for the 1924-
1927 period are presented In Table 11.
Government expenditure at this timewas at an annual rate of close
3 bIllion zlotys.
Smith (1936 describes contemporary discussions that argued the
reform was premature.28




Sept 1924 6.5 3.8 0.0
Dec. 1924 4.6 1.7 0.0
Mar. 1925 3.8 0.9 0.0
June 1925 —0.3 —0.6 0.0
Sept 1925 —0.3 2.2 4.1
Dec. 1925 3.3 6.8 15.9
Mar. 1926 0.0 —2.0 —5.0
June 1926 3.7 6.3 9.0
Sept 1926 3.6 0.5 —3.7
Dec. 1926 0.4 0.6 0.0
Mar. 1927 2.2 1.1 0.0
June 1927 0.9 1.4 0.0
Sept 1927 3.8 —0.3 0.0
Dec. 1927 1.6 0.0 0.0
Note: Data are rates of change, at a monthly rate, over the three month
period ending in specified month.
In July 1925 the fixed exchange rate gave way, after the Bank of
Poland refused to continue support at the 5.18 exchange rate. The Bank
continued to intervene, obtaining a loan from the Federal Reserve in August
to moderate the depreciation. With its stabilization a failure, domestic
output falling, and further labor troubles, the Grabski. government resigned
in November 1925. After a short—lived appreciation, the zloty early in 1926
resumed its depreciation, peaking at 11 zlotys to the dollar in June, then
appreciating until it reached the level of 8.90 to the dollar at which it
was stabilized.29
There are two main questions. First, why did the inflation resume?
And second, how did it stop, this time definitively? The worsening of the
budget situation and renewed money growth, together with the need to
depreciate following the deterioration of foreign trade ,accountfor the
resumption of inflation. The inflation was significantly fuelled by rapid
growth in bank deposits (Table 12). In January 1925, the currency/deposit
ratio was 1.68; two years later it was 0.81. correspondingly the stock of
currency grew at an average annual rate of' 19.5% over the two years to
January 1927, whIle bank deposits Increased at an annual rate of 69.7%, Ml
increasing by 41.5%.
A more picturesque complementary description is that this was a
'small—change inflation'. The Bank of' Poland had the monopoly on the issue
of large notes and was not permitted to create notes to finance the deficit.
The Treasury was however permitted to mint coins and small notes. Table 12
presents data. During 1925 the stock of small change, issued by the
Treasury, increased by over 250 million zlotys, an amount close to the
budget deficit for that year of 330 million zlotys. Although Bank of Poland
notes were removed from circulation in consequence of the foreign exchange
reserve outflow, the total stock of currency Increased in 1925. Over the
two years of the renewed inflation, 1925—1926, the increase In monetary base
was accounted for almost entirely by the increase in small—change.24 The
lesson is that a government determined to circumvent restrictions on deficit
-inancing will find a way.
24Gunther (1931) examines the period In detail. See also Landau and
Tomaszewski (1984) and Heilperin (1931).1925 1926





















Table 12: MONEY ANDMONETARYGROWTH IN POLAND, 1925-1928.
CurrencyHank of Poland Small Deposits
notes change
Jan. 1925 694.3 553.2 141.1 413.0
-Jan. 1926 781.0 362.0 419.0 690.5
Jan. 1927 992.1 584.8 407.3 1224.4
Jan. 1928 1288.6 1003.3 285.3 1823.5
Annual growth 19.5 2.8 69.9 72.2
rate,
1927/1925 (%)
Source: International Abstract, pp.167—168. First four rows are in i111ons
of zlotys.
At the end of 1925 the government tried again to stabilize the
budget, cutting expenditures. It raised taxes and other revenues in early
1926. At the sa.e time exports, particularly of coal to strike—bound
Britain. rose rapidly. Despite the improving budget and balance of trade.
the zloty continued to depreciate through the middle of the year.
The Third Attempt: In May 1926 the government changed in a coup by
Pilsudski. Circumstances were already favorable to a stabilization. A
budget surplus was created through valorization and higher taxes, growth
aided by exports resumed, and the currency was stabilized de facto.
The money doctor, E.W. Kesuerer was called in to advise how to
cement the improvement. He recommended that the government not be allowed
to issue treasury notes and be required to balance the budget.More
important was the recommendation of full convertibility, secured by a
foreign loan, with foreign supervision. In October 1927 the Polish31
government signed a loan agree.ent for $62 million and 2 million pounds
sterling. Free convertibility was instituted and an American adviser to the
Polish government supervised implementation of the terms of the loan.
The Polish government agreed to foreign supervision in the belief
that foreign confidence would be enhanced and foreign investment flow in.
This did not happen, but budget balance, monetary discipline and a strong
trade performance maintained price level and exchange rate stability.
5. THE ITALIAN STABILIZATION, 1947.
In the fall of 1947 Italy achieved a rapid disinflation from triple
digit inflation. Wartime inflation was followed by a year of price
stability that ended in the middle of 1946. Figure 7 shows consumer and
wholesale price indexes and the money supply for the period from the middle
of 1946 to the end of 1948. With money continuing to grow after the
inflation rate was stabilized, real balances grew fast from the end of 1947.
The fall in the inflation rate was rapid and decisive. In the
second quarter of 1947 both wholesale and consumer price indexes were rising
at more than 1OO per year; by the end of the year both indexes were
falling. There was no significant inflation again in Italy until the Korean
War, and after that until the 1960's.The stabilization is noteworthy both
because it took place from a triple digit rate, before the economy
approached the disintegration of hyperinflation, and because of its 8peed.
The money supply grew at an annual rate of 60% in the fifteen months
before September 1947. Table 13 gives quarterly data on macroeconomic
variables. The money supply continued to grow at 50% per annu. immediatelyLu
a.,s.— \ p
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after the stabilization; the annual rate of growth for 1948 was however
below that for the year ending before the stabilization. To put the money
growth rates in perspective, note that GNP was rising very rapidly over this
period, by 31% from 1945 to 1946, and 18% from 1946 to 1947.33
Table 13: THE ITALIANSTABILIZATION,1946-1948.
asaa.asass asaflsssass — a san n.s a sans a a a ass as. = — — a a ass as an flaa.
CPI Money Dem.dep. Une.p. md.
infi.growth growth (*11.) prod.
Sept 46 30.9 92.0 217.5 1.86 60
Dec. 46 118.4 86.7 99.4 2.10 48
Mar. 47 56.9 10.4 12.2 2.18 47
June 47 119.8 71.2 113.6 2.00 68
Sep. 47 72.0 50.3 32.8 1.87 73
Dec. 47 —26.9 51.3 10.5 1.80 64
Mar. 48 —0.8 20.4 42.7 2.25 66
June 48 —6.7 31.1 74.9 2.28 70
Sept 48 6.4 34.5 39.1 2.12 76
Dec. 48 0.6 43.2 37.1 72
e/P Prem. S/P W/P mt.
rate
Sept 46 100 26.8 100 100 3.89
Dec. 46 78.550.3 134.5 121.74.21
Mar. 47 75.255.2 224.4 128.54.12
June 47 79.338.3 177.9 136.74.50
Sept 47 66.130.9 135.7 135.24.65
Dec. 47 82.8—1.1 94.1 159.84.67
Mar. 48 80.815.5 109.9 160.74.31
June 48 82.2 1.7 94.4 163.54.36
Sept 48 81.1 8.0 117.2 169.94.40
Dec. 48 80.914.8 120.6 169.64.53
nnnaanaaantaaatn = a = annfl anna = nan an an ass an flnaannnafl flnafl
Sources and Notes: 1. All growth rates are calculated for given month (t)
relative to three months before (t-3) at annual rate. 2. Columns 1 and the
wage index (W, in column 9) are from Lutz and Lutz (1950). p. 5.3. Columns
2 and 3 are from Hlldebrand (1965), p. 21. Column 2 Is an Ml •easure,
comprising currency and demand deposits at banks and the post office.
Growth rate of demand deposits is calculated from "Total demand deposit'
column inHildebrand.4. Columns 4 and 5 are from Simpson (1949/50), p.215
through March 1948, column 5 thereafter linked through International
Financial Statistics data; industrial production index was 100 in 1938. 5.
column 6 is the "average' exchange rate (average of free and controlled
rates) divided by CPI; column 7 is the premium of the curb rate over the
average rate; column 8 is a stock •arket index relative to CPI; column 9 is
the wage relative to CP1; column 10 is the government bond yield. Except
for the wage, these data are from International Financial Statistics.34
The data in Table 13 do not establish the extent to which the
stabilization had real effects. Une.ployment had risen by 400,000 within
six months of the policy change; industrial production fell by over 10% in
the three months following the stabilization program. But because the data
are not seasonally adjusted, it is difficult to identify the direct effect
of the stabilization program on output.25 Forexample, suppose that the
pattern for Sept 1946-March 1947 is taken as the seasonal in industrial
production. Then industrial production in December 1947 and March 1948
would have been high rather than low.1 Although industrial output was above
the September 1947 level within a year, unemployment stayed high through the
end of 1948 and was widely blamed on the stabilization program.
The success of the stabilization is commonly attributed to a squeeze
on private credit caused by the finely—tuned introduction of reserve
requirements for the commercial banks that went into effect in September
1947.25 This was the key economic measure of the stabilization program put
into effect by the De Gasperi government that took office at the end of May,
1947, the first post—War government to exclude the Communists. Luigi
Einaudi, who moved from the governorship of the Bank of Italy to become
Deputy Premier and Budget Minister, is regarded as the architect of the
program.
About 40% of the Ml money stock consisted of demand deposits, which
were typically increasing more rapidly than currency in the pre-
25This interpretation is offered by Faa (1949), Lutz and Lutz
(1950), Baffi (1958), and with some reservations, Simpson (1949/50),
and Hildebrand (1965). Reserve requirements did exist before
September 1947 but were totally inconsequential, amounting to less
than 0.5% of deposits.35
stabilization period (Table 13). Deposit growth was virtually unconstrained
by reserve requirements. Table 14 shows free and required reserves. Prior
to September 1947 there was essentially no check——beyond prudence——on the
banks' ability to expand credit.At the end of August the commercial banks
-wereinformed of the new reserve requirements, to go into effect at the end
of September. The reserve requirements were set at a level that wiped out
excess
Table 14: COMMERCIAL BANK RESERVE RATIOS
Total Required Free
Dec. 1946 25.7 0.4 25.3
June 1947 17.3 0.3 I'7.0
Sept 1947 15.1 14.7 0.4
Dec. 1947 21.9 16.5 5.4
Mar. 1948 23.6 19.0 4.6
June 1948 27.5 20.7 6.8
Sept 1948 28.6 22.3 6.3
Dec. 1948 25.1 23.4 1.7
1949 (av.) 26.3 24.1 2.2
Source: Hildebrand (1965), p.31.
reserves and made further Increases in bank credit unsupported by an
increase In holdings of high—powered money Impossible.
Bank credit to the private sector grew at an annual rate of 30.5k in
the last quarter of 1947; fros March to December 1948 it grew at an annual
rate in excess of 6O.26 The contraction of the rate of growth of credit to
26Data are froni International Financial Statistics, line41, for
January and July 1949. Because the data for 1947 and 1948 do not
appear comparable, we cannot compare data for March 1948 with
December 1947.36
the private sector caused by the increase In reserve requirements was
neither sharp nor prolonged.
In addition to raising reserve requirements, the stabilization
program raised the discount rate fro. 4% to 5.5%. Nominal market interest
rates rose temporarily; the real rate of interest became significantly
positive in the last quarter of 1947 as the price level fell.
New laws sought to limit direct financing of the Treasury by the
Banca d'Jtalia.27 The Treasury was however entitled to overdraft facilities
at the Bank, equal to 15% of current expenditures. The budget deficit was
at this ti.e continuing to fall. The cash deficit had been 13% of GNP in
1946 but was down to less than 10% of GNP In 1947.28 The reduction in the
deficit was accomplished in part through the imposition of three capital
levies in 1947.29
With further attacks on the deficit infeasible, the stabilization
program concentrated Its efforts on controlling credit granted to the
private Bector.By raising reserve requirements It also ensured commercial
bank financing of part of the budget deficit: in 1948 58% of the budget
deficit was financed by private banks, as compared with 27% in 1947. The
budget deficit was though mainly responsible for the increase in the money
base.
27See Huldebrand (1965) pp28—30 fora fuller description of the
abilization program.
Simpson (1949/50) p.212 shows the deficit higher in 1948 than in
1947; Baffi (1958) p.423 has a monotonic fall In the deficit as a
rcentage of GNP from the end of the War to fiscal year 1950/51.
Hirschman (1948) p.600 refers to these levies, the first
installment of which was paid in May 1947.37
Despite the standard accounts, the extraordinary success of the
stabilization is somewhat Mysterious.Although Monetary and fiscal policy
were becoming •ore restrictive over the period 1947—48, there is no decisive
change in policy visible in the data in Table 13 or in the budget deficit
that suggests a clean break with the past in late 1947.
Indeed, the co—incidence of tI.ing between the break in the
inflation rate and the reserve requirement change is suspicious, given that
no price controls were imposed: normally a change in monetary policy
operating through aggregate demand takes time to affect prices. Nor do the
changes in nominal interest rates and the rate of money growth support the
view that a strong credit squeeze caused the stabilization—-though once
deflation was under way, the real interest rate reached very high levels
that did indeed squeeze borrowers.
There is a strong argument in the Italian case that expectations of
reform and of a foreign loan played a significant part in the
stabilization.30 Figure 8 shows the stock Market index, the curbexchange
rate and the CPI for the period from mid—1946 to the end of 1948. The De
Gasperi government took office at the end of May 1947. The stock price
index peaked in April 1947. The curb exchange rate peaked in May 1947.
Both these events point to expectations of reduced inflation at that time.
The Marshall Plan speech was at the beginning of June 1947. From that point
on both the curb and the average exchange rate fell, until the free and the
fficial exchange rates were unified at the end of the year.
30Most authors discussing the period mention thesefactors, but
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Our Interpretation of the Italian stabilization is that It was an
event waiting for an excuse to happen. With the balance of payments and
exchange rate problems solved by the Marshall plan, with a strong government
in office, with the budget deficit coming down steadily, with real balances
-squeezed, there was no good reason for the inflation to continue. The
falling average exchange rate and dishoarding of stocks31 set
disinflationary forces in motion by the middle of 1947. It took a policy
change to stop the inflation, but the for, of the change was less
significant than the fact that it took place; the change in reserve
requirements put only a temporary pause in the rapid growth of both money
and private credit.
31We do not have inventory data, though severalsources claim there
was hoarding through the middle of 1947 and that dishoarding helped
force the inflation rate down.39
6. THE ISRAELI STABILIZATION, 1985?
The Israeli Inflation rate rose by stages from 2% per annum In 1967-
70 to the 1000% per annum range at the end of 1984.32 The stages can be
seen in Figure 9: the inflation rate hit 50% per annum in 1975 after the
1973 Yom Kippur War; was reduced to 30—40% by 1977; by the end of 1979 It
was around 130% where It remained until the end of 1983; at the end of 1984
the price level was 5.5 times Its level a year earlier. A policy package
put into action at the begInning of July 1985 stabilized the dollar exchange
rate and succeeded in reducing the inflation rate for the three months fron
July to October 1985 to an annual rate of 58%.
Underlying the Israeli inflation were massive budget deficits and
rapid monetary growth. Money growth is 8een in Figure 9, with quasi—money
keeping pace with prices throughout33 and Ml growth substantially below
inflation for much of the period as the level of real balances fell.
Table 15 presents budget deficit and defense spending data. The
deficit from the mid—seventies to the early eighties is significantly
affected by the subsidization of loans to the private sector given at fixed
nominal Interest rates while the inflation rate wasaccelerating.At Its
peak this subsidy was equal to nearly 7% of GNP. Interest costs in the
budget data In Table 15 are appropriately calculated on a real basis. The
shift from a net foreign deficit to net foreign receipts after 1980 results
from the change in United States aid from loans to grants.
32This account draws on Fischer (1982, 1984a, 1984b) and Bruno and
scher (1986).
The return on •ost of the quasi—•oney aggregate is indexed to either
the price level or the exchange rate, so that the accommodation of
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Table 15: THE ISRAELI BUDGET, 1960—84.
(Percent of GNP)
Do.es-Net Domes- Domes- Total DefenseBase
tic foreign tic tic def—spend— money
spend—spend-rev— def— icit irig creat-
ing ing enue icit ion
1960—6427.0 1.2 28.8 —1.8 —0.6 9.4 2.5
1965—6732.0 2.8 29.6 2.4 2.4 12.5 2.2
1968—7341.0 6.6 34.4 6.6 13.2 23.6 3.2
1974—7756.4 3.3 42.1 14.3 17.6 29.3 2.6
1978—8060.7 2.0 45.5 15.2 17.2 23.9 2.0
1981—8361.0 —0.3 46.5 14.4 14.1 23.8 2.1
1984 62.9 —4.0 46.0 16.9 12.9 24.0 3.2
Source: Updated from Bruno and Fischer (1986)
Note in Table 15 that government revenue from base money creation
has shown no consistent trend. The concurrent rise in the growth rate of
base and reduction in demand for base have maintained constant the revenue
from money printing (as a share of GNP). With the government at the same
time borrowing indexed and lending nominal, it can be argued that the total
effect of a money—caused increase in the lnf1ation rate is to increase
rather than decrease the budget deficit. (Sokoler, 1985).
Economic Structure: We briefly describe special features of the economic
syste. before turning to macroeconomic policy. The most persistent
structural feature of the Israeli economy has been a trade deficit of about
20% of GNP, which extends back even to the 1920's. The trade deficit
Increased to above 30% of GNP after 1973, but was reduced over the next few
years. The deficit has been financed by unilateral transfers from both
private and governmental sources, and increasingly in the period after 197341
by borrowing, withtheresult that the net external debt increased from 35%
to 65% of GNP between 1973 and 1979. Grants as opposed to loans from the
United States played •an increasingly important part after 1980. Net
external debt at the end of 1984 was about 80% of GNP.34
- Indexationwas widespread in the Israeli economy well before the
acceleration of inflation. Wage indexation had been introduced in World War
II, and Indexation of government bond yields in the mid-50's after a period
of high inflation. lndexation wasfullyconsistent with low inflation rates
In the sixties.
Wage setting is dominated by the presence of a national trade union
organization, the Histadrut, which is also the owner of 25% of industry.
Wage Betting takes the form of a negotiation on real wages and, separately,
an agreement on the Cost of living adjustments that will apply over the
duration of the contract. The highly centralized process of wage setting has
several times been used to make economy—wide changes in wages.
A •ajor change In the structure of the asset markets occurred in
1977 when the first non Labor Party government took office. The finance
minister was from the Liberal Party, whose belief In free markets was
Immediately and virtually exclusively implemented in a liberalization of
foreign exchange holdings. Israelis were permitted to hold foreign exchange
directly and dollar-linked interest bearing domestic bank accounts. These
(PATAM) accounts were not initially used as medium of exchange but over the
next two years there was a shift into PATAM from local—currency denominated
assets, leading to the pattern seen in Figure 9 where the inflation rate
34With exports at about 40% ofGNP, the debt/export ratio Is below
that of leading Latin American debtors.42
climbed rapidly as the growth rate of Ml fell.35The monetary base fell as
a percentage of GNP from 15% at the beginning of the seventies to 2.5% in
1984.
The exchange rate was an adjustable peg until 1975, when a
discretionary crawl of 2% per month was introduced. After the
liberalization in 1977 the exchange rate was ostensibly to be free—floating,
but very soon became heavily managed. The exchange rate generally followed
PPP except for an episode to be reviewed below.
Stabilization Attempts.
The post—1973 war inflation was attacked by restrictive fiscal
policy, credit restraint, and in 1974 an agreement with the Histadrut to
forego one round of wage indexation following a devaluation. The
restrictive policy took effect slowly, but did succeed in bringing the
inflation rate down to less than 30% per annum in 1976 without significantly
raising unemployment.
Following the 1979 inflationary jump to above 100%, a new attempt
was made to fight inflation, by attacking the budget deficit. The initial
impulse of the policy, which devalued and cut subsidies radically, was
heavily inflationary. The budget deficit and balance of payments deficit
fell during 1980, but the inflation rate was slow to come down. With an
election on line in the following year, the Finance Minister and his policy
were replaced within a year of the start of the restrictive policy.
351n September 1977 23% of the holdings of M5 (a broad financial asset
aggregate) were nominal, in local currency ,26%foreign currency
linked, and 51% price level linked; the average for 1979 was 11.5%
local currency linked, 39.5% foreign currency linked, and 49% price
level linked.43
The new Finance Minister, Aridor, provided an innovative and
expensive policy experiment over the next two years. Before the 1981
election the inflation rate was reduced by cutting tariffs, especially on
consumer durables, in what was claimed to be a local version of supply side
economics.36
In 1981 the argument that the Israeli inflation was merely a bubble
gained ground, partly because there had been no simple link between either
the growth rate of Ml or the budget deficit and inflation. Budget deficits
had if anything been reduced during the seventies as the inflation rate
increased, and as can be seen from Figure 9, the growth rate of Ml had
declined just at the time the inflation rate jumped.
in accordance with the bubble diagnosis, a new policy was introduced
whereby both the exchange rate and controlled prices would rise at 5% per
month. Expectations would then, it was argued, crystallize around the 5%
per month rate, and the annual inflation rate would accordingly fall from
130% to 80%. This could have worked had the Inflation been a pure bubble,
but the size of the budget deficit at the time makes that diagnosis
doubtful. As Figure 10 shows, the real exchange rate appreciated, even
against the appreciating dollar, throughout 1982 and into the first half of
1983. Correspondingly the current account deficit Increased from under $1
billion in 1980 to over $2 billion by 1983. The inflation rate never fell
below 100%, and by mid—1983 was back to the 130% level.
6Total receipts from the tariff obligingly rose as the tariff was
cut, not a great surprise when the cut was widely expected to be













Whether or not the bubble diagnosis had been correct, it was obvious
by the middle of 1982 that the policy of atte.pting to stabilize inflation
through the exchange rate and controlled prices was an expensive failure.
But it was only at the end of1983that Aridor was forced to resign, after a
collapse of the prices of bank shares.37 A large devaluation followed, and
the Inflation rate for 1984 was kicked up above 400%.
The new finance minister gave a higher priority to reducing the
balance of payments deficit than to controlling inflation, but nonetheless
promised strict budgetary austerity. Whatever austerity there might have
been vanished when an election campaign got under way in the spring of 1984
with the real wage rising more than 15% in the first half of theyear.
The National Unity Government: Despite the 400% inflation, and thewar in
Lebanon, the opposition Labor Party did not win the July election,38 and had
to form a coalition government. Tough anti—inflationary policy was widely
expected, but failed to •aterialize.
37me banks had been•regulating' (a term used by the banks to the
Commission of Inquiry into the bank share collapse). the prices of
their shares, causing them to produce a real rate of return of over
15% per annum. However the worsening balance of payments created the
expectation of a devaluation and a move out of bank shares on a scale
that the banks could not stem (despite their large foreign borrowings
in 1983). Eventually the market collapsed, with the government
stepping in to stabilize the price of the shares by essentially
turning them into indexed bonds. At the time of writing the
gmmission of Inquiry has not yet reported its findings.
The lack of money illusion by Israelis no doubt played a role in
reducing the electoral Cost of inflation. Despite slow real GNP
Frowth, per capita consumption rose rapidly during the period from
1977to1984 in which the Likud Party was in power. From 1977 to
1983, real GNP grew at an annual rate of 2.5% while real consu•ption
grew at 6.3%.45
The first stabilization program of the new government was a package
deal with the Histadrut and employers whereby wages and prices would be
frozen for three months. However devaluation continued. The planned 1985/6
budget had sharply cut the deficit (to about 10% of GNP from 17%) but with
the government spending increasing amounts to maintain the prices of
subsidized goods, the deficit did not fall. Nor were other planned cuts in
government spending implemented.
By April and May 1985 the package deal had fallen apart and
inflation was back to the 1000% per annum range. The balance of payments
deficit had been reduced from its 1983 level, but foreign exchange reserves
were falling rapidly, the government budget deficit was at an unsustainable
level (both domestic and foreign financing were difficult to obtain) and
there was a clear need for action.
Before we examine the stabilization program of July 1985, we briefly
take up the question of why the policy was so long delayed. Aside from a
brief period during which the bubble inflation argument was popular, there
was never much disagreement in Israel about the fundamental measures that
would have to be taken to end inflation. There was however dispute about
whether more than restrictive aggregate demand .easures were needed. Some
economists argued that the use of wage and price controls and agreements
with the unions were doo.ed to failure and that attempts to use such
measures only prolonged the adjustment period and made failure more likely.
Their scepticism of the end of 1984 package deal, reflected in a telegram
from economists at Tel Aviv University to the government at the time the
deal was struck, turned out to be justified.46
Others argued that heavy unemployment following cuts in demand could
be avoided if wages and prices could be moved immediately to close to new
equilibriu, levels rather than forcing changes through the Phillips curve
tradeoff. The jury is still out on the 1985 stabilization, but as of the
timeofwriting (November 1985) the latter view looks right.
The lack of action was a result of the evaluation that the costs of
inflation, moderated by indexatlon. were less than those of the unemployment
and emigration that a serious stabilization attempt would cause. The slogan
was "Israel cannot afford unemployment", and by comparison with other
Countries Israel succeeded. The unemployment rate in Israel did not rise
markedly in the seventies, in part because the government increased its
share of employment from 23% of the labor force to 30%.
The July 1985 StabIlization Program.
The new program had three .aIn components. First, the budget
deficit was to be cut to below 10% of GNP, mainly by cutting subsidies.
Second, there was a devaluation to be followed by a stable (though not
formally fixed) exchange rate against the dollar. The subsidy Cuts produced
a jump In the price level of 28% in July. Third, wage and price controls
were put in place and wage Indexation and other elements of existing labor
Contracts were suspended by emergency decree. Wage earners were not
compensated for most of the July inflation, with the result that the
real wage was expected to fall about 20%, In support of the
program, monetary policy would control the growth of nominal credit. An
element in the willingness of the government to implement the program was47
the knowledge that a requested supplementary U.S. aid package of $1.5
billion over the next two years was making progress through the Congress and
was likely to be granted within a few months.
Table 16 shows the early results of the stabilization.
Table 16: THE IMMEDIATE POST—STABILIZATION PERIOD, ISRAEL 1985.
(Columns 1—4 are monthly rates of change.)
CPI M2PATAMNominal Real UnemploymentNominal
Inflation credit wage rate mt. rate
June 14.9 7.218.6 16.8 111 6.61 20.5
July 27.8 56.6 0.8 0.4 92 8.0 20.3
Aug. 4.0 13.8—1.8 6.0 —— 8.0 15.7
Sept. 3.0 4.1—3.5 3.5 —— ——
12.22 Oct. 4.7 17.5 —3.1 1.5 —— —— 5.5
Source: Bank of israel.
1. This is the rate for the second quarter, not fully comparable with
monthly rates.
2. Nominal interest rate is average rate per month on bank overdrafts;
November figure is for November 18.
The inflation rate has fallen to around 4% per •onth.39. There has been a
shift back into shekel—denominated assets (M2) which have risen 52% in real
terms since July. There has been a small shift out of dollar linked assets
(PATAM) and strict control of credit. Real interest rates remained
extremely high through October, but were sharply reduced in November.
Unemployment has risen, and may rise further as government carries out
dismissals that have been in process since July.
39The October figure is and was expected to be seasonallyhigh as
produce prices increased and new winter fashions were introduce; the
data are not seasonally corrected.48
The current exchange rate is being easily held, and with the arrival
of close to $2 billion in U.S. aid in September and October can Continue to
be held for sore ti.e: the continuing shift out of PATAM deposits indicates
a lack of speculative pressure. The black market premiu, dropped from close
to 20% at the beginning of the stabilization to 8% in November, The trade
deficit in the third quarter of 1985 was 29% less than the deficit in the
same quarter a year before.
Underlying the early success of the 8tabilization progra. are:
first, the sharp cut in the budget deficit, which has fallen from 17% to 8%
of GNP due both to reduced spending and to the familiar effect of a lower
inflation rate on tax revenues; second the reduction in aggregate demand
that results from the large cut in the real wage; and third the real
devaluation and domestic contraction that has improved the current account
leading to both higher exports and lower imports.
But stabilization is not yet assured. In the first instance,
nominal and real wages are scheduled to increase starting at the end of
November. The more than 4% monthly inflation in October triggered a COLA
clausethat will raise nominal wages by 3.7% at the end of November.
Further, negotiations in July among the government, Histadrut and employers
that ended protests and strikes against the stabilization package40 fixed
real wage increases of 4% per month for three months December 1985 to
February 1986. These will bring the real wage back to within 10% of its
id-1985 level. There is an agreement with the Employers' Association that
prices will not be adjusted in response to these wage changes, but such an
40The Histadrut objected in particular to the use ofemergency
decrees to suspend the terms of labor contracts.49
agreement is difficult to enforce. Further, price controls will have to be
lifted at some stage, presumably before pressure on them makes It impossible
to remove them without a significant jump in the price level.41
Second, further cuts in the deficit, to take effect in the fiscal
year starting April 1986, are politically difficult. The Treasury and
outside economists argue that a cut of $500 •illIon or 2% of GNP is needed
to maintain the disinflationary momentum. This would still leave a deficit
of 6% of GNP to be financed, which might be possible through monetary base
growth at a low rate of inflation with the religuificatlon of the economy,
and with only small increases in internal and external debt. But it is
argued that the only place left to cut spending is on defense, which has
already taken some cuts, and where resistance to further cuts Is high. The
structure of' the 1986 budget will be crucial to the success of the plan. So
too will a revival of the growth of per capita GM', which is now at the same
level as It was in 1980.
41For the most part, price controls do notappear to have been
binding in the early months of the stabilization program although
isolated reports of shortages have appeared.50
7. ARGENTINA'S 1985 AUSTRAL PLAN
inflation in Argentina has been on the increase over the past 40
years. In the period from 1944 to 1954 it averaged 20 percent per year,
nearly 30 percent in each of the next two decades, and 218 percent per year
in the period 1974—84. Figure 11 shows the monthly rate of inflation over
this period. The more prominent episodes in inflation history are clearly
visible. There is the inflation of 1959 with the subsequent decline In the
Aisogaray stabilization; the famous Krieger—Vasena stabilization of the
second part of the 1960s; the Peronist inflation of 1975—76; the Martinez de
Hoz stabilization and then the accelerating inflation of the 1980s that led
to the current stabilization called the "Austral Plan" of June 1985.42
Even though there were only three sharp inflation blips in the past
40 years, Argentina managed over this period to have just as many central
bankers: 40 Presidents of the Central Bank! And finance ministers
outnumbered even military coups. The standing problems of the Argentine
economy are budget deficits and real wage demands that lead to loss of
competitiveness, payments crises, depreciation and inflation.
We start here with a brief discussion of the background for the
inflation of the 1980s. Following Peronism in the early 1976 a military
government seized power in early 1976. One of the objectives was economic
stabilization, especially stabilization of inflation which ran at over 600
,percent per year at the time of the military take-over.
420n the Argentine experience see de Pablo (1982) and Williamson




































































































From 1976 to 1981 Econo.ics Minister Martinez de l4oz tried to
stabilize inflation. Over the period, all his attempts notwithstanding,
inflation still averaged 141 percent. The continuing budget deficits were
certainly one important reason why inflation could not be brought under
-control.
The Martinez de Hoz episode for.sani.portant prelude to the
present stabilization for two reasons. First it was in this period that use
of the exchange rates as a tool of inflation stabilization was first
attempted. Second. and related to the exchange rate policy, in this period a
large external debt was built up which now renders stabilization and budget
correction all the more difficult.
Martinez de Hoz To Grinspun: The policy of pre—set exchange depreciation
(the tablita) was initiated in 1978 and .aintained until early 1981. During
that period the government announced a time—table for exchange depreciation
over the coming months, hoping that reduced rates of exchange depreciation
would slow down the domestic rate of inflation through expectations channels
and the "law of one price'. The program was partially successful in that
inflation did, indeed, came down from more than 170 percent to under 100
percent. But this occurred at the cost of a growing overvaluation.
Domestic wage and price increases slowed down less rapidly than the exchange
rate and overvaluation accordingly increased by the month.43
Those who areignorant ofhistory are doomed to repeat it: not only
Aridor in Israel, who ignored the lessons of Argentina two years
before, but also Martinez de }Ioz, who ignored the failed exchange-
rate based stabilization attempts of the German and Austrian
hyperinflations. A period of real exchange rate appreciation
consequent on attempted exchange rate based inflation stabilization
is remarkably common in high inflation economies.52
The cu.ulative real appreciation led to adverse speculation which
was facilitated by a complete liberalization of capital flows. Increasingly
banks and the government borrowed abroad to finance private capital
outflows. The magnitude of the cumulative outflow in 1978—82 is difficult to
assess but estimates range between 20 and 30 bIllion SV.S.44 In 1981, in
the course of a change of military presidents the overvaluation ultimately
forced a depreciation. In the period from early 1981 to the end of 1983,
when Alfonsin took power, there followed a cumulative exchange depreciation
of 2400 percent. Of course this depreciation was almost entirely nominal
even though it eliminated a large part of the previous real appreciation. In
this period various economics ministers tried to contain inflation in the
face of large budget deficits, the debt shock, the Malvinas war and the
elections.
Perhaps the most interesting episode in this period were the months
of June to August 1982, right after the Malvinas war, when Dagnino Pastore
and Domingo Cavallo attempted stabilization and growth by wiping out the
real value of debts via sharply negative real interest rates and wage
agreements. The wage discipline quickly broke downanda new economic team
presided over the remainder oftheterm of the transition military
government. The inflation rate rose from 187% in 1982 to 380 % in 1983.
Table 17 shows that over the period rral wages increased sharply while
The estimates are derived by comparing the increase in gross
external debt, adjusted for changes in reserves, with the cumulative
current account. The difference represents the increase in
Argentinian assets abroad. Possible overestimation results if
military expenditures and tourist spending abroad are underreported
in the official statistics. See Dornbusch (1985) and World Bank
(1985)53
output recovered somewhat even though it did not return to the 1980 level.
The budget deficit showed some improvement although it must be noted that
the Interpretation is complicated by the fact that losses on exchange
guarantees of the central bank are part of the reported deficit.
The Alfonsin government got of f on the wrong foot. Real wages were
allowed to rise, even though they had already 8harply increased at the end
of the •illtary government. No correction of the budget was undertaken and
inflation jumped to nearly 700 percent. The relations with debtor banks
became increasingly strained as arrears and rhetoric built up. A stand—by
agreement with the IMF, entered into in January 1983 was cancelled in
January 1984. All of 1984 represents a transition toward hyperinflation.
The Plan of June 1985: The sharply accelerating inflation and the
difficulties in rescheduling the debt led in early 1985 to a change of
management and of approach. Gradualism was tried under a new IMF program
entered into in December 1984. The program involved budget cutting and real
depreciation both of which got underway. But the deteriorating level of
economic activity and the failure of inflation to respond led in April—May
1985 to a search for a new program.54
Table 17: MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR ARGENTINA
1982 1983 1984 1985
I II III
Industrial Prod. 80 88 91 85 83 79
Real Wage 80 100 120 136 131 112
Budget Deficit 12 11 11 12.5 2.0*
Inflation 187 380 659 847 993 250
Real Interest Rate 0.2 3.1 1.1 1.7—5.4 5.7
*Target (For outcome, see Table 18 below)
Notes: Industrial production, 1980=100; real wage, index 1983 =100; budget
deficit, including Central Bank, percent of GDP; inflation rate of the CPI,
annual rate ;realeffective interest rate, percent per month, using WPI as
deflator.
The loss of confidence in gradualist policy, and an unwillingness to
accept IMF austerity led to the conception of the Austral Plan. The plan
strikes an ingenious balance between the fundamentals of monetary and fiscal
austerity and pragmatism that is absent from IMF-style programs. The
pragmatism resides in the adoption of wage—price controls as the central
feature of the disinflation program. Nere are the key features of the
Austral plan which went into effect on June 14th 1985:
1. The implementation of the plan was preceded by an increase in public
sector prices and a sharp devaluation. Export tariffs and import duties
were imposed.
2. Wage—price controls are imposed until further notice.55
3. The government undertook not to emit any money to finance the
treasury. The budget deficit wastobe Cut by tax and spending measures.
4. A time table (tablita) wasannouncedto adjust outstanding loan
Contracts for the immediate and unanticipated cessation of inflation. This
was the first time this feature——which had earlier been discussed as a
theoretical possibility——was used in a stabilization plan.
5. A new money——the Austral——was introduced and was fixed to the dollar
at 0.8 Australs (also called Penguins) to the $U.S. The old money continued
circulating, some of It being stamped with the new Autral symbol.
6. The program was accepted by the IMF and rescheduling negotiations
with the creditor banks started. Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Voicker was
rumored to be the god father of the program.
It is worth asking at the outset where the ideas for the plan caine
from. There is little question that the economic team——economics minister
Juan Sourrouille, finance minister Mario Brodersohn, and the two
undersecretaries Adolpho Canitrot and Jose Luis Machinea——are the principal
architects. But what is particularly interesting Is the extraordinary care
and attention to historical experience that went into the design of the
plan. It is certainly the case that in April studies were well advanced to
the point of being concerned with the precise measures that were taken in
hyperinflation stabilization programs. The authors of the plan became
intimately familiar with the experiences in Europe in the 1920s, especially
the stabilization of the German hyperinflation.
Not surprisingly most of the features of the plan can be traced to
the successful German experiment, and much less to recent ideas from Latin56
America or elsewhere.45 In particular the idea of controlling the
disinflation via exchange rate fixing had been a key feature of the German
program. But the Argentinlans went further and imposed, in addition controls
on wages and prices. The wage-price controls were imposed because the team
remembered the catastrophic experience under economic minister Martinez de
Hoz when exchange rates were used for disinflation without an accompanying
Incomes policy thus leading to a massive overvaluation of the exchange rate,
capital flight and ultimately collapse of the program. Even though the team
opted for price controls there was concern and scepticism about their
effectiveness because no formal control apparatus was available or could be
set up at short notice. Perhaps that also was good luck because, as It turns
out, the fact that prices have some possibility of adjustment removes the
threat of shortages or a catch—up explosion once the control policy is
abandoned.
In only three months the desperate outlook has changed completely.
Most impressive, the opinion polls have been showing up to 80 percent
approval rating for the policies. Even though the November 1985 elections
did not give Alfonsin the landslide victory that he hoped for, he still
received a solid mandate to move ahead and cement the stabilisation and to
put Argentina back on her feet.
Of course, it is much too early to predict ultimate success. So far
much of the stabilization remains provisional and the most difficult choices
lie ahead. The budget stabilisation was achieved by sharply increasing all
public sector prices and by raising tariffs on exports and imports. These
45Despite the many similarities between theArgentinian and Israeli
stabilizations, they were conceived independently.57
measures raised revenues and the freeze on prices helped increase real tax
collection by eli.inating the inflationary erosion of the tax yield. Just
as in the Ger.an experience of the 1920s this proved a critical Ingredient
In early success for Argentina. Real wages have been cut by more than 20
percent since last year. All these measures explain how the deficit In the
public accounts that was about 12 percent of GDP in early 1985 is expected
to decline to only 2.0 percent by next year.
Table 18 shows the budget data for 1983—4 and the 1985 projection.




Revenue 21.7 22.5 25.3 21.5 27.2
Expenditure 32.1 30.7 28.8 29.0 28.5
Deficit 10.4 8.2 3.5 7.5 1.3
Consolidated Deficlt* 11.5 10.9 6.0 12.0 2.5
•lncluding operations of the Central Bank
Export taxes on agricultural goods have long financed most of the
budget, but they do so to the detriment of productivity, growth and foreign
exchange revenue. Regular taxation, levied on a broad base such as wealth
or comprehensive income or expenditure must replace the ad hoc taxes that
ow fill the big budget gap.
The second problem is the real interest rate. Because the government
has undertaken to print money only as it appears through the balance of58
payments the real •oney stock is still less than twice its hyperinflation
low and hence interest rates are extremely high. The real lending rate is in
the range of 40 to 80 percent per annum. That is a serious proble, because
the cost of credit exceeds the profitability of investments, thus leading to
accumulation of debts that will become bad if high rates persist46, a
deterioration of financial stability and a decline in activity. If high real
rates do persist there will inevitably have to come a point where the
government either explicitly writes down debts or else creates an
inflationary burst, as in 1982, that wipes out the real value of the
excessive indebtedness.
The high real interest rate poses an immensely difficult challenge
for the authorities. Table 19 helps understand what is at issue. The Table
shows the levels of the monetary aggregates and the cumulative percentage
increase since June. Considering the fact of a fixed exchange rate and
wage—price controls an increase in the money stock of 70 to 80 percent seems
entirely out of line with a credible disinflation policy. One might be
tempted to think that the program must collapse within a short time because
money is growing so fast——except that similar and more rapid rates of growth
of money occurred in all the stabilizations.
46The inefficiency of the Argentinlan banking system is a major
issue: it is claimed that the average cost for the commercial banks
of administering deposits is above 1.5% per month. With a stable
price level and zero interest on deposits, this would still leave the
minimum real interest rate at 18% per annum.59




May 1355 927 3445
June 1950 1630 4877
July 2792 2589 6546
August 3070 2811 7393
September 3293 3010 8206
% Change
June—Sept. 69% 85% 68%
Memo: Inflation June—Sept. 11 t
Figure 12 shows why the interest rate can remain high despite the
money growth rates of Table 19. The real monetary base declined during the
period of escalating inflation. In that period rapid growth of money and
credit was outpaced by even faster growth of prices. But when the
stabilization took place the dynamics of •oney and prices changed: the fixed
exchange rate, fixed public sector prices and wage—price controls
substantially froze the level of prices. The commitment not to emit money
froze the monetary base except for the possibility of foreign exchange
inflows through foreign borrowing or repatriation of Argentine assets
abroad——and there Is little prospect that Argentinians will bring those
assets home soon.
Under these conditions the real monetary base was the same the day
before and the day after the reform and so was the nominal interest rate.
üt the disappearance of inflation implied that the real interest rate now
wassky-high.Moreover it would remain at that level unless the government










the baseinvolvesthe risk of a loss in credibility. Anylossof
credibility would immediately be visible in the parallel market for foreign
exchange where all transactions occur that are not permitted at the official
rate. The govern.ent would then face increasing difficulties of maintaining
the official rate. A resurgence of inflation would be the likely effect
within a quite short period. Credibility thus is a very serious issue. But
the high real interest rates are equally threatening. The government
therefore must find a •iddle course betweeen the two ways of losing
credibility——too much and too little credit expansion.
The policy prescription for Argentina would therefore seen to be the
following: to pursue a policy that expands monetary aggregates by private
credit, subject to the provision that if and when the parallel market turns
markedly the expansion is immediately stopped. There isnoirreparable harm
that comes from trying to liquify the economy to the largest extent
possible. Certainly there isstillexcess capacity in the Argentinian
economy. But credibility is an issue. For that reason early fiscal reform,
providing assurance that the underlying budgetary source of monetary
expansion has been removed, would free the government's hands for reflation
through private credit.
The third issue is how to abandon wage-price controls without aresurgence
of inflation. If these controls are not relaxed before shortages become a major
problem, they can inflict serious damage to the economy. But when prices are
liberalized the problem is to prevent a price and then a wage explosion that
will destroy the cut in real wages that has already been achieved. Perhaps the
only chance is to liberalize imports and use effective import competition to61
check price increases. That is a very risky strategy because ItMay cost
employment and scarce foreign exchange. But a renewed burst of inflation
and strikes to restore real wages are a much worse prospect.
Of course, i.port liberalization and a fixed exchange rate in the
face of ongoing Inflation--cumulatIvely 11 percent since June—-are rightlya
very touchy issue in Argentina. The experi.ent of disinflation under
Martinez de Hoz left the country in a mess and no policy.aker iseager to
renew the experiment. But there is an important difference. The
competitive position of Argentina has been improved over the lastyear.
Especially the devaluation preceding the stabilization created room for
some erosion during the period of stabilization. Such an appreciation after
an initial real depreciation took place in Most of the successful
stabilizations reviewed In this paper.
But real appreciations took place also in the failed
stabilizations——and hence the need to make budget reform thelynchpln of the
stabilization. To prevent the renewal of inflationarymomentum, the primary
immediate objectives of policy should remain zerowage increases and zero
currency depreciation.Removal of export taxes is a vehicle for improving
competitiveness without the need to move the exchange rate. Selective
liberalization of tariffs on imports of raw materials and otherindustrial
inputs would help reduce costs without adverse effectson domestic
employment, thus further •oderatlng Inflationary pressure.
8. CONCLUSIONS.62
Table 20 provides a capsule comparative summary of features of the
stabilizations. We start by drawing out a few major conclusions, and then
compare the recent Israeli and Argentinian stabilizations with earlier
atte.pts.
-- Thekey issues are the budget, the exchange rate, and •oney. Budget
deficits were significantly reduced in each of the stabilizations, but were
not in all cases completely removed. In the Austrian stabilization, foreign
loans provided a two year period during which the budget was brought into
balance after a sharp initial cut; in the Italian stabilization a large
deficit of about lO of GNPremained. However, with Italy growing fast and
the national debt small, the government could easily finance itself without
resorting to inflationary money base creation. In addition to spending
Cuts, there was in each case a significant budgetary gain to the government
from the reduction in real tax losses due to inflation,
The exchange rate was pegged in each of the stabilizations except
the Italian, where the lira was in principle left to float. Even here after
effectively unifying free and official exchange rates, the authorities in
practice intervened to keep the rate in a narrow band, and maintained
exchange controls. Exchange rate pegging may be a necessary condition for
stabilization, but it is certainly not sufficient——as failed attempts at
stabilization through exchange rate pegging In Germany, Austria. Poland,
Israel and Argentina establish. The successful stabilizations typically
start with substantial real devaluation, followed during the early part of
the program by real appreciation as prices rise while the exchange rate
remains fixed. Without the initial over-devaluation, a balance of payments








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Perhaps the most overlooked lesson of the stabilizations is the need
to print money after stabilizing. Ultimately, after the economy is
reliquified, money growth will return to low levels. Rut as Sargent (1982)
and others who have studied the stabilizations have pointed out, initial
money supply growth is rapid. Thus any policy package that makes a fetish
out of limits on money growth to secure credibility is heading for trouble.
The trouble shows up in high real interest rates——which have been a feature
in any case of all the stabilizations——that are prolonged to the point where
either serious recession or a violation of the money growth limits result.
One of the benefits of focussing on the exchange rate and the budget as
intermediate targets of policy is to divert attention from money, where the
path required for stabilization is not one that makes sense to believers in
a simple quantity theory. And after a hyperinflation, the quantity theory
looks good and nay indeed lie behind private sector expectations.
Legal restrictions on money issue and/or budget deficits were
introduced in several stabilizations. Their power Cannot be judged without
evaluating the political and legal situation in each country, but it is
clear from the Polish case that they may be circumvented in unusualways.
Foreign loans or their prospect, appear in all the stabilizations.
In the pre—Worid War II cases, they were in some cases a signal rather than
an inherent necessity——the Polish loan in 1927 is a good example. In
general though the foreign loan provides reassurance that the exchange rate
can be held, and certification that outside governments are sufficiently
impressed by the stabilization plan to bet on it.64
Stabilizations typically cause unemployment, followed as they are by
a credit squeeze. Whether the unemployment is inevitable is equivalent to
asking whether a credit squeeze and high real interest rates can be avoided.
Given negative real rates in many of the inflations, an increase in the real
rate is frequently unavoidable. It is less obvious that the rate has to be
high. Because the successful stabilization is typically not the first
attempt, high real rates may be needed for some time. The success of the
1947 Italian stabilization on the first try with relatively little
disruption and low nominal interest rates supports the view that high real
rates are the price paid for the effects of previous failures on
expectations. The creation of unemployment following a stabilization does
not mean that the previous hyperinflationary situation was better, but it
does mean that it is not credible to promise painless disinflation even when
it is a stabilization from economic disorder.
The two ongoing stabilization attempts, of Israel and Argentina,
differ in several respects from the 1920's cases. The major difference Is
in their attempt to move the economy at once to a new low inflation
equilibrium through wage and price controls implemented at the same time as
macro policy measures——the cut in the budget, devaluation and subsequent
exchange rate pegging, and monetary measures——that should make that low
inflation equilibrium sustainable. They differ also in that the Argentinian
andIsraelieconomies were in far better shape in 1985 than Germany, Austria
and Poland in the 1920's.
-
Wehave not to this point touched on the credibility issue, which
has received much attention particularly in the Argentinian stabilization.65
The point of multiple rational expectations equilibria introduced in Section
1 is that the fundamentals are not necessarily sufficient to tie down the
Inflation rate. We do not want to exaggerate though. In both the Israeli
and Argentinian ca8es the governments were not previously running policies
that could have produced low as well as high inflation.
But once the fundamentals are in place, there is still a credibility
problem. The credibility issue can be best understood by considering a
government that initiates a stabilization program that will cause
unemployment, but that will give it up if unemployment reaches a high enough
level. Whether it carries through Its program depends on whether prices and
wages respond quickly, or whether rather inflation is ground down through
the Phillips curve unemployment mechanism. And whether that happensmay
well depend on whether the private sector is convinced that this isa
serious stabilization attempt.
In this view, the modern stabilization try to short—circuit the
problem of private sector expectations by using controls to movewages and
prices quickly to the low inflation equilibrium. This choice Is made not in
ignorance of the distortions caused by wage and price controls, but rather
on the judgment that relative price distortions during temporary controls
that end in stability are far less costly than the unemployment that would
otherwise be needed to drive inflation down.
The use of wage and price controls does not remove the credibility
dilemma——for the controls have ultimately to be lifted——but it doesgive the
governments more time to demonstrate that they have made fundamental changes
in policy. In the meantime, as we saw above, the fact ofprice stability66
helps improvethebudget immediately by removing the inflation erosion of
tax receipts. But unless the Israeli and Argentinian governments quickly
reach and maintain budget deficit levels that are sustainable without
inflationary finance, their stabilizations will fail.47 Failure can come
not only from not cutting existing spending or raising revenues48, but also
from maintaining recessionary pressure for too long.
47Opponents of wage and price controls argue that the controls
frequently substitute for rather than complement funda.ental changes
in policy. That is no doubt correct, but does not mean that they
should not be used in conjunction with a serious stabilization
package. Rockoff (1984, p246) concludes his book on United States
wage and price controls: "They are a medicine to be used to dull the
pain and tranquilize the patient while monetary restraint and reforn
of our fiscal affairs work the fundamental cure (TJhe
extremists on both sides of the debate over controls are wrong.
Controls are more than a mere placebo. But they will never be a
gnder drug for an ailing, inflationary economy."
The proportions in which these measures are applied depends on the
details of the budget in each country.67
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